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SURFACE WATER DRAINAGE
Donald V. Dobbins*
The intensified use of agricultural land, the expansion of industrial facili-
ties and the rapid growth of our urban and suburban areas have all contributed
to a constantly increasing awareness of our surface water' drainage problems
and the laws applicable to those problems. In this country three basic rules
of law have been applied to the drainage of surface waters. These rules are
now commonly referred to as the "civil law," "common enemy" and "reas-
onable use" rules. These three rules differ greatly in both their basic theories
and origins, and each has inherent benefits and shortcomings.
The civil law rule
The civil law rule finds its basis in the law of natural drainage. Aqua
currit, et debet curere, ut solebat ex jure naturae. Water runs, and should run,
as it is wont to do by natural right2
In Illinois this rule was adopted by its highest court in two cases decided
in 1869.? The court in the later case stated the rule as follows:
As water must flow, and some rule in regard to it must be estab-
lished where land is held under the artificial titles created by
human law, there can clearly be no other rule at once so equitable
and so easy of application as that which enforces natural laws.
There is no surprise or hardship in this, for each successive owner
takes with whatever advantages or inconveniences nature has
stamped upon his land.4
Other states which have adopted the civil law rule have used comparable lan-
guage in expressing their concept of the rule.5
The civil law rule seems to have had its origin in the Roman law from
whence it moved into France and became a part of the Napoleonic Code.' The
Louisiana Code, which embodies the rule, states:
If rain-water or other waters have their course regulated from one
ground to another, whether it be by nature of the place, or by some
regulation, or by title, or by an ancient possession, the proprietors
of the said grounds cannot innovate any thing as to the ancient
course of the waters. Thus, he who has the upper grounds cannot
change the course of the water, either by turning it some other way,
* LL.B.; member of the Illinois Bar.
1 For the purposes of this article a distinction will be made between surface waters
and waters flowing in a natural watercourse or impounded in a lake or pond. This distinc-
tion is valid in most states which adhere to the "common enemy" rule but is generally
ignored in the "civil law" and "reasonable use" jurisdictions. The general concept of the
term "surface waters" includes only those waters which fall or come upon the surface of
the ground in a diffused state. When these waters reach a ditch or natural watercourse they
lose their character as surface waters. 56 AM. JUR., Waters § 65, pp. 547-48 (1957).
2 3 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 439 (14th ed. 1896); Kauffman v.
Griesemer, 26 Pa. 407, 413 (1856).
3 Gillham v. Madison County R.R., 49 Ill. 484 (1869); Gormley v. Sanford, 52 Ill.
158 (1869).
4 Gormley v. Sanford, 52 Ill. 158 (1869).
5 Gray v. McWilliams, 98 Cal. 157, 32 Pac. 976 (1893); Nininger v. Norwood, 72 Ala.
277 (1882); Martin v. Riddle, 26 Pa. 415 (1848).
6 FARNHAM, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 889a (1904); 1 DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW§ 1583 (Straham transl. 2d ed. 1850); FRENCH CIVIL CODE § 640 (1804).
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or rendering it more rapid, or making any other changes in it to
the prejudice of the owner of the lower grounds. Neither can he
who has the lower estate do any thing that may hinder his grounds
from receiving the water which they ought to receive, and that in
the manner which has been regulated.
7
It should be noted that in its pure form the civil law rule grants to the
owner of the higher or dominant land an easement of natural flow over the
lo*er or servient land, but it does not grant to the owner of the higher land
any right to enlarge the natural easement or to increase the burden upon the
lower land by hastening the flow of the water from the higher to the lower land.
The common enemy rule
The common enemy rule is the antithesis of the civil rule. The rule, as
stated by Beasley, C.J., in an early New Jersey case is that:
[N]o right of any kind can be claimed in the mere flow of surface
water, and .. .neither its retention, diversion, repulsion or altered
transmission is an actionable injury, even though damage ensues."
The origin of this rule is obscure. At first some courts were of the opinion
that it was a part of the English common law and referred to it as the "com-
mon law" rule.9 This concept of the origin of the rule has been scrutinized on
several occasions and it now is generally accepted by all authorities that the
rule had its origin not in England but in Massachusetts."0 The term "common
enemy" was first applied to this rule by the New Jersey Supreme Court.'
Apparently the court mistakenly applied to surface waters the English rule
that the sea was a common enemy.' Actually, the English rule as to the drain-
age of the surface waters did not start to develop until about the middle of
the nineteenth century, and that rule follows the civil law."
Under the common enemy rule, applied in its strict sense, the upper-
although not dominant -landowner has the right to use any means he chooses
to rid his land of surface water, and at the same time the lower -although
7 LA. CIVrI CODE § 660 (1870).
8 Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N.J.L. 351, 353 (Sup. Ct. 1865).
9 Barnett v. Matagorda Rice & Irrigation Co., 98 Tex. 355, 83 S.W. 801 (1904);
Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo. 271 (1884); Edwards v. Charlotte,
C.&A.R.R., 39 S.C. 472, 18 S.E. 58 (1884).
10 FARNHAM, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 889C (1904); Kinyon and McClure, Inter-
ferences With Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REv. 891 (1940); Thompson, Surface Waters,
23 Am. L. REV. 372 (1889); Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956);
Miller v. Letzerich, 121 Tex. 248, 49 S.W.2d 404 (1932); Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass.
106 (1865); Dickinson V. Worcester, 89 Mass. 19 (1863); Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., 63
Mass. 171 (1851). In this connection it should be noted that the Michigan court in the
case of Boyd v. Conklin, 54 Mich. 583, 20 N.W. 595, 598 (1884), referred to the common
enemy rule as the "Massachusetts doctrine."
11 Town of Union ads. Durkes, 38 N.J.L. 21 (Sup. Ct. 1875).
12 Lord Tenterden in his. concurring opinion in The King v. Commissioners of Sewers
for Pagham, Sussex, 8 Barn. & C. 356, 108 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1076 (K.B. 1828) stated "the
sea is a common enemy." The Texas Supreme Court in Miller v. Letzerich, 121 Tex. 248,
49 S.W.2d 404, 411 (1932) said, "To say that surface waters . . .are a 'common enemy,'
comparable to the constant ravages of the sea against its shore line, would tax the credulity
of a child."
13 Thompson, in his article, Surface Waters, 23 Am. L. REV. 372, 391 (1889), stated:
"In view of the fact that there is not, and never has been, any law in England which will
support the Massachusetts doctrine, it is difficult to see how it can be justified, and certainly
it can have no claim to the name so commonly applied to it." See also Kinyon and McClure,
Interferences With Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REV. 891, 899 (1940).
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not servient- landowner may use similar means to prevent the surface water
from coming upon his land. Under this concept of the law, it is quite possible
for a contest to develop in which the owner of the higher land may lawfully
hasten the discharge of surface water from his land while the owner of the
lower land, equally within his rights, may prevent the water from flowing onto
his land. 4
The reasonable use rule
The rule of reasonable use seeks to avoid the obvious inequities which
arise from the strict application of either the civil law or the common enemy
rule. This rule, as announced by the New Jersey Supreme Court, is:
The rule of reasonableness has the particular virtue of flexibility.
The issue of reasonableness or unreasonableness becomes a question
of fact to be determined in each case upon a consideration of all
the relevant circumstances, including such factors as the amount of
harm caused, the forseeability of the harm which results, the pur-
pose or motive with which the possessor acted, and all other relevant
matter.... It is... properly a consideration in these cases whether
the utility of the possessor's use of his land outweighs the gravity
of the harm which results from his alteration of the flow of surface
waters. 15
This concept of the reasonable use rule with further refinements was
adopted by the American Law Institute in its Restatement of the Law of Torts'
The rule amounts to a balancing of equities, taking into consideration not only
the relative benefit to the one tract and harm to the other,'r but also, according
to the Restatement, such items as the social value which the law attaches to the
land use which has been invaded, the suitability of the land for the use to
which it is devoted, 9 the impracticality of preventing or avoiding the invasion"0
and common standards of decency.2
The New Jersey and Restatement versions of this rule achieve their objec-
tive of relieving the hardships which were bound to flow from the strict applica-
tion of the other two rules, but the guides for the application of the rule are
so amorphous and uncertain as to cause hardship.
Modifications of the civil law rule
It is not feasible in this article to detail all of the enlargements, qualifica-
tions and restrictions which have been granted onto the civil law rule by the
courts and legislatures of the jurisdictions which adhere to it.22 Instead, it is
14 King v. Cade, 205 Okla. 666, 240 P.2d 88 (1951).
15 Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
16 RzSTATEMENT, TORTS § 833 (1939).
17 Id. at § 826.
18 Id. at § 827.
19 Ibid.
20 Id. at § 828.
21 Id. at § 829.
22 The following states are presently classified as "civil law" states in Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d.
421 (1958): Alabama, Arizona (?), California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas (as to
agricultural land only), Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi (?), New
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio (as to rural areas only), Oregon, Pennsylvania (as to rural
land only), South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas (formerly a common enemy state) and Vermont.
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only possible to enumerate a few of these modifications as a sampling of the
present status of this rule. It is, however, safe to assume that no jurisdiction
strictly applies the civil law rule in its original form and that the rule has been
modified by the courts and legislatures to increase by varying degrees the rights
of the owners of the higher lands.
As has been previously pointed out, the civil law rule in its original form
was a grant of an easement of natural flow to the owner of the higher land; the
owner of the lower land was prohibited from obstructing or interfering with
the natural flow of surface water onto his land. The rule did not grant to the
owner of the higher land any right to improve or alter the natural drainage
of his land and thereby accelerate the flow of surface water from his land onto
the lower-land. Over the course of the past hundred years this rule has been
enlarged and modified rather extensively as to the upper owner.
When Illinois first adopted and applied the civil law rule' the sole ques-
tion presented was whether a lower owner had the right to obstruct the flow
of surface water from higher agricultural lands. The court rejected the com-
mon enemy doctrine which had been announced in the earlier Massachusetts
cases and in effect adopted the Pennsylvania civil law rule. One of the Penn-
sylvania cases24 cited by the Illinois court had already extended the concept of
the civil law rule to permit the owner of the dominant tenement to improve
his land by throwing an increased volume of water upon the inferior estate
through natural and customary channels.
The second time the question was presented to the Illinois court 5 the case
involved the obstruction of the natural flow of surface water across unimproved
city lots. The court adhered to its former conclusions and indicated that the
same rule would be applied to urban lands.
Illinois in 1870 adopted a new constitution in which it authorized its legis-
lature to "pass laws permitting the owners of land to construct drains, ditches
and levees for agricultural, sanitary or mining purposes across the lands of
others."2 This grant of power was a substantial enlargement of the theory of
the civil law rule. The Illinois legislature in 1885"r and again in 195528 exer-
cised the power conferred upon it by enacting such laws. The legislature, how-
ever, did not limit itself to a mere exercise of the authority granted by the con-
stitution, but still further enlarged the rights of an upper owner under the civil
law rule:
Owners of land may drain the same in the general course of
natural drainage, by constructing open or covered drains, dis-
charging the same into any natural water course, or into any natural
depression whereby the water will be carried into some natural
The Iowa Court has recently said in Boat v. Van Veen, 241 Iowa 1152, 44 N.W.2d 671
(1950), and in Stouder v. Dashner, 242 Iowa 1340, 49 N.W.2d 859 (1951), that it had not
adopted either the civil law or the common enemy rules entirely.
23 Gillham v. Madison County R.R., 49 Ill. 484 (1869).
24 Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 -Pa. 407 (1856).
25 Gormley v. Sanford, 52 Ill. 158 (1869).
26 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 31 (1870).
27 Ill. Laws 1885, at 77, §§ 5-10.
28 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 42, § 2-2-10 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
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water course ... and when such drainage is wholly upon the owner's
land he shall not be liable in damages therefor...."
This statutory enlargement of the civil law rule granted to the owner of the
dominant heritage a very substantial right which he did not possess under the
rule in its original form and also increased the burden upon the servient land.
Kansas has adopted a similar statute which, however, is only applicable to
agricultural lands."
Illinois courts have in several instances attempted to limit the right of an
upper owner to improve the natural drainage upon his land by restricting the
volume of water he can throw off to the capacity of the depression or water-
course into which the water is emptied."' For the most part this limitation
has been ineffective because of the broad grant of power contained in the statute
and the practical impossibility of ascertaining the natural capacity of the outlet
under all circumstances.
The Illinois courts have repeatedly upheld the right of the upper owner
to improve the drainage of his land by hastening the flow of water from his
land. 2 The only real limitations in Illinois upon this right are that the improve-
ment of the drainage upon the upper land must be in the general course of
natural drainage and that water from one watershed cannot be diverted into
a different watershed."3
As a result of these developments the improvement of drainage conditions
in Illinois usually begins in the flat lands, which lie in the upper reaches of a
watershed, and gradually works its way downstream. The upper owners im-
prove the natural drainage of their lands by artificial means and hasten the
flow of the water onto the lower lands. The drainage condition of the lower
lands is thereby aggravated and the owners thereof improve their drainage by
artificial means. This process continues until the waters reach the streams and
watercoures, which are then deepened and widened by excavation. When the
water reach the larger rivers the landowners along these rivers construct or
raise levees to prevent ever more frequent flooding of their lands. While this
is far from being an ideal situation, it most certainly is a logical consequence
of a rule of law which states "each successive owner takes with whatever ad-
vantages or inconveniences nature has stamped upon his land."34
A considerable portion of this article has been devoted to the evolution
of the civil law rule in Illinois. This is due not only to the fact that the author
is more familiar with Illinois law, but also because he believes the growth of
the law in that state to be rather typical of the way the civil law rule has grown
29 Ill. Laws 1885, at 77, § 4.
30 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-106 (1949).
31 Dettmer v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 287 Ill. 513, 123 N.E. 37 (1919); People v.
Peeler, 290 I1. 451, 125 N.E. 306 (1919); Fenton & Thompson R.R. v. Adams, 221
II. 201, 77 N.E. 531 (1906); Daum v. Cooper, 208 Ill. 391, 70 N.E. 327 (1904).
32 Adams v. Abel, 290 Ill. 496, 125 N.E. 320 (1919); Broadwell Special Drainage Dist.
v. Lawrence, 231 Ill. 86, 83 N.E. 104 (1907); Wilson v. Bondurant, 142 Ill. 645, 32 N.E.
498 (1892); Peck v. Herrington, 109 Ill. 611 (1884).
33 Graham v. Keene, 143 Ill. 425, 32 N.E. 180 (1892); Young v. Commissioners of
Highways, 134 Ill. 569, 25 N.E. 689 (1890); Anderson v. Henderson, 124 Ill. 164, 16 N.E.
232 (1888).
34 Gormley v. Sanford, 52 Ill. 158 (1869).
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in other states. The courts of Alabama, 5 Iowa,36 Louisiana, 7 Maryland,"8
Ohio,"9 Oregon,4" Pennsylvania4 and South Dakota,42 among others, have
modified the civil law rule in effect in their states in order to permit the owner
of the dominant estate to improve the drainage on his land, even though such
improvement increases the burden upon the servient estate. The courts applied
varying reasons for reaching this result, but the enlargement of the rights of
the upper owner is usually qualified by such terms as "reasonable use," "without
unreasonable injury" and "materially and unduly increased."
Modifications of the common enemy rule
Approximately the same number of jurisdictions have adopted the com-
mon enemy rule43 as have adopted the civil law rule, and again it is impossible
to explore in detail all the modifications which the "common enemy" jurisdic-
tions have made in their rule. The common enemy rule in its original form,
by permitting an upper owner to dispose of his surface water as he pleased and
permitting a lower owner to fend off the water as he saw fit, invited conflicts
rather than settled them.4 As a result, modifications of the rule were impera-
tive, and the various definitions of the rule as applied today bear only slight
resemblance to the rule as first announced.
In one of the earlier cases which applied the common enemy rule in a
modified form the Iowa court said that in improving the drainage conditions
of his land the landowner must respect the rights of his neighbor and that he
could not make his property more valuable by an act which renders his neigh-
bor's prbperty less valuable.45 In another early case in Missouri, a strong com-
mon enemy state, the court held that a landowner was not warranted in improv-
ing his own property in such a manner as to seriously interfere with the property
of his neighbor."
Modifications of the common enemy rule have become still more frequent
in recent years. Arkansas has said that a landowner, in fending off surface
waters, must do no "unnecesary" harm to the land of his neighbor,4 7 and that
35 Vinson v. Turner, 252 Ala. 271, 40 So. 2d 863 (1949).
36 Boat v. Van Veen, 241 Iowa 1152, 44 N.W.2d 859 (1951).
37 Martin v. Jett, 12 La. 501 (1838).
38 Bishop v. Richard, 193 Md. 6, 65 A.2d 334 (1949).
39 Ratcliffe v. Indian Hill Acres, Inc., 93 Ohio App. 231, 113 N.E.2d 30 (1952).
40 Levene v. City of Salem, 191 Ore. 182, 229 P.2d 255 (1951).
41 Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. 207 (1856).
42 La Fleur v. Kolda, 71 S.D. 162, 22 N.W.2d 741 (1946).
43 The following jurisdictions are presently classified as "common enemy" jurisdictions
in Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421 (1958): Arizona (?), Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas (as to urban land only), Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi (?),
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York (which recognizes a distinction between rural and
urban lands), North Dakota, Ohio (as to urban areas only), Oklahoma, Pennsylvania (as
to urban lands only), South Carolina, Virginia, Washingtonand Wisconsin.
44 For a collection of several cases in which the common enemy rule was applied in its
strict sense see Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1338, 1341-44 (1950).
45 Livingston v. McDonald, 21 Iowa 160 (1866).
46 Freudenstein v. Heine, 6 Mo. App. 287 (Ct. App. 1878).
47 Stacey v. Walker, 222 Ark. 819, 262 S.W.2d 889 (1953); Turner v. Smith, 217 Ark.
441, 231 S.W.2d 110 (1950).
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he must act in good faith and without negligence.48 Montana has stated that
the landowner's "use must be without malice of negligence."49
In a Nebraska case a landowner was held liable for the damages occa-
sioned by the construction of a flume in such a manner as to change the course
of the water and inflict injury to the plaintiff's land, even though it was undis-
puted that there was no negligence in the construction of the flume.5" In a
more recent Nebraska case the court held that a lower landowner's construction
of a dike across a swale was not a "reasonable use" of the lower land. 1
The Ohio courts have also modified the common enemy rule in force in
the urban areas of that state by requiring that the action be "reasonable.""2
Oklahoma has expressly stated that the common enemy rule has been modified
by limiting the exercise of the rights granted by the rule to those instances in
which no injury is done to the adjoining land.5
In Pennsylvania the rule applicable in urban areas has been modified by
forbidding unreasonable or unnecessary changes in the quantity or the quality
of the flow.54 In Virginia the rule has been comparably modified by subjecting
it to the qualification that the landowner "must exercise his rights not wantonly,
unnecessarily or carelessly, but in good faith and with such care as not to injure
needlessly the property of the adjacent owner."5
In view of the severe limitations which the courts of several states have
placed upon the exercise, by both the upper and lower owners, of the rights
originally conferred upon them by the common enemy rule, it would seem that
a new rule - the modified common enemy rule - has emerged. This rule
recognizes the right to make changes in natural drainage but places reasonable
use limitations upon the exercise of that right. The limitations are, however,
rather nebulous in character and thus uncertainty has again been substituted
for certainty in order to avoid the harsh results which necessarily followed the
strict application of the rule in its original form.
The evolution of the reasonable use rule
In an 1862 New Hampshire case involving percolating waters the court
refused to embrace any rule which would give a landowner either an absolute
right to drain or protect his land or no right to do so." The court adopted a
rule which permitted the "reasonable use or management" of one's land under
the facts peculiar to his particular case with due consideration being given to
the rights of each of the parties. The court further pointed out that what con-
48 ITimmons v. Clayton, 222 Ark. 327, 259 S.W.2d 501 (1953).
49 Ryan v. Quinlan, 45 Mont. 521, 124 Pac. 512, 516 (1912).
50 Snyder v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 144 Neb. 308, 13 N.W.2d
160 (1944).
51 Everett v. Teigeler, 162 Neb. 769, 77 N.W.2d 467 (1956).
52 Keiser v. Mann, 102 Ohio App. 324, 143 N.E.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1956), appeal dis-
missed, 166 Ohio 190, 140 N.E.2d 565 (1957); Lunsford v. Stewart, 95 Ohio App. 383,
120 N.E.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1953).
53 Gregory v. Bogdanoff, 307 P.2d 841 (Okla. 1957); Haskins v. Felder, 240 P.2d 960
(Okla. 1954); King v. Cade, 205 Okla. 666, 240 P.2d 88 (1951); Garrett v. Haworth,
183 Okla. 569, 83 P.2d 822 (1938).
54 Chamberlain v. Ciaffoni, 373 Pa. 430, 96 A.2d 140 (1953).
55 Mason v. Lamb, 189 Va. 348, 53 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1949).
56 Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862).
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stitutes a reasonable use is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined
by a jury under proper instructions. In 1870 the New Hampshire court applied
this same rule to other surface waters57 and re-applied it in a 1901 case.58
Minnesota originally adopted and applied a modified common enemy
rule, 5 but in 1948 the Minnesota court said that its reasonable use modifica-
tions of the common enemy rule had developed to the point where its doctrine
was a distinct reasonable use rule, independent of both the common enemy and
the civil law rules.6" The Minnesota court in a 1956 case adhered to its position
that its doctrine was a separate and distinct rule.6
New Jersey, which long adhered to the common enemy rule,62 expressly
abandoned that rule in 1956 and adopted the reasonable use rule,6" which
it reaffirmed in 1957.64 Justice Brennan's opinion in the 1956 case65 leaves
little doubt but that the court was primarily persuaded to abandon its former
position and adopt the reasonable use doctrine by the Kinyon and McClure
article entitled "Interferences With Surface Waters,"66 which had appeared
16 years previously.
So far as the author has been able to ascertain, the three states mentioned
above-New Hampshire, Minnesota and New Jersey-are the only states
which purport to have embraced the reasonable use doctrine as a separate and
distinct rule. And despite the protestations of the Minnesota court, the author
is of the opinion that the Minnesota rule is a classic statement of the modified
common enemy rule, rather than the pure reasonable use rule as exemplified
by the statements of that rule in the New Jersey cases67 and the Restatement."
Conclusion
Some authors and courts have taken the position that the civil law and
the common enemy rules have been so modified that there is now no valid dis-
tinction between those rules and the rule of reasonable use. While it is true that
the modifications of the first two rules have been substantial, the conclusion
that the three rules are now one and the same appears to be unjustified.
The civil law rule in its unmodified form creates an implied easement of
natural flow in favor of the higher land across the lower land. This easement
concept remains as the basic element of the civil law rule, which is not to be
found in the common enemy rule (either in its original or modified form) or
in the reasonable use rule. The rule has been modified in some jurisdictions
to permit the owner of the dominant estate to improve the drainage upon his
57 Swett v. 'Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870).
58 Franklin v. Durgee, 71 N.H. 186, 51 Ad. 911 (1901).
59 O'Brien v. St. Paul, 25 Minn. 331 (1878).
60 Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948).
61 Johnson v. Agerbeck, 247 Minn. 432, 77 N.W.2d 539 (1956).
62 Town of Union ads. Durkes, 38 N.J.L. 21 (Sup. Ct. 1875).
63 Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
64 Hopler v. Morris Hills Regional Dist., 45 N.J. Super. 409, 133 A.2d 336 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1957).
65 Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
66 24 MINN. L. Rav. 891 (1940).
67 Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956); Hopler v. Morris Hills
Regional Dist., 45 N.J. Super. 409, 133 A.2d 336 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957).
68 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §§ 822-31, 833 (1939).
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land in any manner that he pleases, so long as he does so in the general course
of natural drainage. This modification is a grant of an additional right to the
upper owner and is an enlargement of, not a restriction upon, the burden which
the lower land must bear. In other jurisdictions the rule has been less dras-
tically modified in that the improvement of the drainage on the upper lands
must be reasonable and not cause undue hardship to the lower lands. Again
the easement element of the rule remains and the reasonable use limitation is
placed only upon the upper landowner. Thus, the rule, both in its original and
modified forms, grants a right to the owner of the dominant estate and places
a corresponding duty upon the owner of the servient estate.
The common enemy rule in its inception granted unqualified rights to
both the upper and lower landowners but placed no corresponding duty on
either. The modifications of this rule have all had the result of limiting the
rights originally granted under the rule. Thus the rights still remain -
although they must be exercised in a reasonable manner so as not to cause
undue hardships upon the land of a neighbor.
The reasonable use rule is essentially a tort rule involving both intentional
and unintentional invasions of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of
his land. The rule is negative in its concept. It does not grant any rights, but
attempts to define the circumstances under which an owner of land will be
held liable in damages for the use which he makes of his land. It puts the law
of surface water drainage in the category of a private nuisance. No one has
the right to create or maintain a nuisance, but not every nuisance is an action-
able one. So it is with surface waters under this rule. No owner is given any
right to improve the drainage of his land under this rule but if he does so he
may or may not be liable for any injury which results.
Under this analysis of the rules and their present-day applications the
author believes that the differences in the rules are still readily apparent. The
author recognizes the theoretical superiority of the reasonable use rule but feels
that the practical application of the rule is so difficult, and the results are so
uncertain, that this theoretical superiority should give way to more practical
considerations. Both agriculture and industry need a rule which is sufficiently
definite to permit the improvement of surface water drainage without the threat
of a law suit each time such an improvement is constructed. In the absence
of such a rule a prudent man might well be required to seek a declaratory
judgment to determine the reasonableness of his plans before starting the con-
struction of any drainage work which will in any way alter existing conditions.
The very real possibility that what the landowner considers to be reasonable
might be held to be unreasonable by a judge or jury would dictate such a
course. Progress is better served by providing the landowner with a rule of
law which can be interpreted and applied with as much certainty as the public
policy of the state will allow.
